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INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY CHANGES IN THE 




In this paper we analyze the most likely and the most desirable 
developments in financial markets and in a broader sense, the most 
desirable regulation of the financial sector. The purpose of the essay is 
in fact to analyze the most important issues of financial regulation and 
to highlight that finding the most desirable solutions are particularly 
difficult. These difficulties come from purely technical reasons, the 
multi-dimensionality of the analyzed problems, but also some aspects of 
the methodology and philosophy under the current methodological 
approach for financial regulation. 
Keywords: financial regulation, financial crisis, Eurozone 
 
RESUMEN 
En este trabajo se analiza las novedades más probables y más 
deseables en los mercados financieros y en un sentido más amplio, la 
regulación más deseable del sector financiero. El objetivo del ensayo es 
de hecho la señalización de los temas más importantes de la regulación 
financiera y poner de relieve que la búsqueda de las soluciones más 
deseables es particularmente difícil. Estas dificultades provienen de 
razones puramente técnicas, la multidimensionalidad de los problemas 
analizados, pero también algunos aspectos de la metodología y la 
filosofía bajo el enfoque metodológico actual de la regulación financiera. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
hen F. A. von Hayek received the Nobel Prize during the crisis 
of the seventies he said these significant words: "The effects on 
policy of the more ambitious constructions have not been very 
fortunate and I confess that I prefer true but imperfect knowledge, 
even if it leaves much indetermined and unpredictable, to a pretence of 
exact knowledge that is likely to be false." (von Hayek, 1975). In 
response to the economic and political events during the period of 
2007-2009, R. Caballero published the article Macroeconomics after 
crisis that analyzed the Pretense-of-Knowledge syndrome in the current 
research paradigm in macroeconomics. 
 
As the author emphasized in the article, the recent financial crisis has 
contributed significantly to the weakening of the reputation of 
macroeconomics. After the crisis emergence, the predicting capacity 
has been widely questioned. However, the main problem is not the lack 
of this capacity but rather the doubtful choice of dominant paradigm in 
macroeconomics that has been shared between the researchers during 
many years. Of course it is not all about carrying out endless 
methodological or philosophical disputes, but rather about the 
awareness that the underlying model assumptions are directly related 
to the paradigm and the approach chosen by the researcher. 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the most likely and the most 
desirable institutional and regulatory changes introduced immediately 
after the crisis emergence, in the period 2007-2009. Nowadays, in 
2014, the time span is sufficient to acquire the necessary perspective to 
discern and judge properly the reactions of the policy-makers involved 
in the financial policy. 
 
Due to the strong causal relationship of economic and political events 
during the last seven years, the analysis also takes into account 
regulatory arrangements relating to the financial and economic crisis in 
Europe of up to 2010 and the subsequent debt and banking crises 
(Schambaugh, 2012). The extension of the period is necessary in order 
to present a complete picture of events as well as to analyze the most 
desirable institutional and regulatory mechanisms. 
 
The paper is composed by five sections in addition to this introduction It 
is descriptive as well as theoretical and normative in its nature. In the 
second section, the essence of financial regulation as well as the 
relations between regulation and politics are analyzed. Then, in the 
third section, the U.S: institutional regulatory framework is presented. 
In the following section, the regulatory and institutional changes in the 
Euro Area are analyzed. In the fifth one, the role of the central bank for 
the maintenance of the stability of financial system is taken under 
consideration. Finally a set of conclusions are presented. 
W 
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Each of the sections rise further normative doubts. Many questions still 
remains unanswered as the one of the future paradigm of 
macroeconomics research.  In such context, R.Caballero (2010) seems 
to be right: "This distinction between core and periphery is not a matter 
of freshwater versus saltwater economics. (…) The challenges are big, 
but macroeconomists can no longer continue playing internal games. 
The alternative of leaving all the important stuff to the “policy”-types 
and informal commentators cannot be the right approach. (…) whatever 
the solution ultimately is, we will accelerate our convergence to it, and 
reduce the damage we do along the transition, if we focus on reducing 
the extent of our pretense-of knowledge syndrome.” 
 
2. FINANCIAL REGULATION AND ITS RELATION TO POLITICS 
n order to define the relationship between economics and politics, it 
is worth recalling an interesting statement of F. Chodorov (2007): 
“Economics is not politics. One is a science, concerned with the 
immutable and constant laws of nature that determine the production 
and distribution of wealth; the other is the art of ruling. One is amoral, 
the other is moral. Economic laws are self-operating and carry their 
own sanctions, as do all natural laws, while politics deals with man-
made and man-manipulated conventions. As a science, economics 
seeks understanding of invariable principles; politics is ephemeral, its 
subject matter being the day-to-day relations of associated men. 
Economics, like chemistry, has nothing to do with politics. The intrusion 
of politics into the field of economics is simply an evidence of human 
ignorance or arrogance, and is as fatuous as an attempt to control the 
rise and fall of tides.”  
 
Chodorov believes that the intrusion of politics into economics is a 
manifestation of human ignorance and arrogance. The author plays with 
the reader. He notices the fact that economics is not politics, the first 
one is moral and the other one is immoral, but he drives the reader to 
the concept of immorality (social immorality versus absolute 
immorality) and how it shall be defined. Regardless of the philosophical 
aspect of this intrusion into economic policy, it does not seem possible 
to separate them totally. 
 
Mutual relations between politics and economics have been subjected to 
considerable studies from the middle seventies of the last century 
although classical economist as Adam Smith or John Stuart Mill had 
mentioned these article. The first article was published by W. Nordhaus 
(1975) in a seminal paper that established  the foundations of the so-
called Political Business Cycle (PBC) at the seed of the electoral theory. 
In a parallel line, but under a different approach, partisan character. 
I 
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Hibbs (1977a and 1977b) found that the influence of politics on the 
economy is performing according to their ideology, in such a way that 
left-wing governments (Democratic Party in its analysis for the U.S. ) 
seeking its intervention to reduce unemployment as a priority, while 
conservative governments (Republican Party in his study ) focused their 
priority to price stability. In both approaches, as made explicit below, 
the basic assumption was to consider voters as rational. The road to the 
systematic study of the interdependence between politics and 
economics was open a clear way for economists (Mancha, 1993). 
 
Since the second half of the eighties, the literature on PBC increased 
considerably as a branch of game theory, but modifying the previous 
approaching with the assumption  considering the rationality of voters 
and emphasizing the idea of that a rational public intervention 
possibilities of governments and their influence on the evolution of the 
economy is clearly limited. In this line, taking as its starting point the 
work of the Nobel Prizes in Economics Kydland and Prescott (1977) and 
Barro and Gordon (1983), Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Alesina 
(1987) and (1989), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) or Persson 
and Tabellini (1990), it became evident to both the particular case of 
U.S. source references all pioneers in this area, as for most Western 
democracies, it was possible to question the existence of cycles 
systematic both opportunistic or partisan electoral character. 
 
From the last decade of twentieth century up to now the growth of PBC 
has been exponential devoting a special attention to the political 
purposes of economic policies. Alesina, Roubini y Cohen (1997) is a 
good example. The crisis emergence encouraged again the interest for 
PBC in old prominent authors as A. Alesina and and their new 
collaborators1, 
 
Alesina and Stella (2010); Alesina, Carloti and Lecce (2012); and, 
Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (2012) show two possible institutional 
changes aimed to ensure financial stability. According to the first one, 
the Fed shall be responsible for the financial system supervision. In 
opposition, according to the alternative one, the powers of supervision, 
inspection bodies and prudential regulation shall be taken over by 
another institution, independent from the Fed that shall be focused 
primarily on monetary policy. Alesina emphasized the need to examine 
both possibilities, not only from the perspective of the economic 
efficiency and the potential for regulatory capture, but also from the 
point of view of theory of democracy.  
 
In the above mentioned articles Alesina et al. also underlines the fact 
that each of the elements of the analysis may give a different answer to 
question of the necessity to disconnect the financial supervision and the 
monetary policy competences. This issue is analyzed in the last section 
                                               
1 See Alesina, A. and Stella, A.(2010; )Alesina, A., Carloti, D. and Lecce G. 
(2012); and, Alesina  A., Favero C.and Giavazzi F, (2012) 
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of the work on the role the central bank in maintaining financial 
stability. Pointing out this issue is useful to emphasize the close 
relationship between the economic policy (and politics as such) and the 
financial regulation.  
 
The object of the study is to analyze the most desirable and most likely 
institutional and regulatory changes in the financial markets after the 
crisis. In a broader sense, it is also a question of how to ensure the 
stability of the entire financial system. It would therefore be difficult to 
separate the regulatory mechanisms and institutional changes from the 
preceding discretionary decisions of governments and central banks as 
well as from the analysis of macro-prudential policies. 
 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to adopt a broader notion of governance 
and regulatory regime. The adoption of the term governance and 
regulatory regime is not determined only by the desire of 
comprehensive description of events in the period of 2007-2009. From 
the point of view of theoretical and normative analysis, the presentation 
of data related to the institutional and regulatory changes in the 
financial markets after the financial crisis requires also macroprudential 
policies to be included, but macroprudential policies are not regulatory 
changes in the common sense.  On the other hand, the concept of 
financial regulation shall be first defined. 
 
Financial regulation is a set of legislative changes that shall lead 
financial institutions to certain behavior in financial markets. Regulatory 
changes may be the minimal bank capital requirements, restrictions on 
trading of instruments and standards in risk assessment. Their aims 
include maintaining the stability of the financial system as a whole. The 
justification of financial regulation is commonly presented in terms of 
the theory of market failure. Tha theory of regulation as such balances 
between the theory of partial equilibrium and the general equilibrium 
theory. (Hanson, Kashyap and Stein, 2011) 
 
From the point of view of the theory of market failure, the issue of the 
financial system stability is analyzed as an example of public good 
(Shirakawa, 2012). Regulatory changes are also designed to solve other 
type of market failures. First of all, in the context of the functioning of 
financial markets and institutions dealing with the existence of external 
effects and asymmetric information, in particular, moral hazard. 
 
Examples of asymmetric information problems in financial markets are 
analyzed in the third part of the article. Among them we can find the 
liquidity problems in the federal funds market in the U.S. after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers and the issue of institutions too-big-to-fail 
in the context introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) as well as in 
the context of systemic risk. 
 
Correcting market failures is not the only purpose of the financial 
regulation. L. White (1997) presented the objectives of regulation as a 
Institutional and regulatory changes in the financial markets 
after the crisis emergence (2007-09) 
7 
 
Instituto Universitario de Análisis Económico y Social 
Documento de Trabajo 02/2014, 27 páginas, ISSN: 2172-7856 
counterpart of the general public intervention. The first objective of the 
financial regulation is to promote and to guarantee free competition in 
the financial intermediation sector. The second objective is to promote 
market transparency and investor protection. Justice in the distribution 
of resources is parallel to the non-discriminatory access to information 
in the case of the financial regulation. According to the third objective, 
the stability of the financial sector is assumed as part of the broader 
concepts of micro-and macro-economic stability. 
 
White distinguishes four types of the financial sector supervision and 
institutional change: supervision by segments of the financial markets, 
supervision by objectives, functional supervision and single regulator 
supervision (Di Giorgio, Di Niola and Piatti, 2000). The greater the 
degree of financial markets integration is, the greater the need for 
monitoring segments of the financial sector and the degree of 
achievement of the previously defined objectives. It therefore seems 
reasonable to choose the last model of financial regulation: to divide the 
tasks of a central bank between two different organisms, one in charge 
of supervision and regulation and the other one focuses on the 
monetary policy. 
 
From the point of view of the theory of regulation, financial regulation is 
divided into micro-prudential regulation and macro-prudential 
regulation. At the same definitions of terms micro-prudential and 
macro-prudential regulations have their own dogma problems. It is 
assumed that the micro-prudential regulation focuses on the 
mechanisms and effects described in the theory of partial equilibrium 
while macro-prudential regulation is related to the neoclassical general 
equilibrium theory (Hanson, Kashyap and Stein, 2011). This 
explanation, however, is closely related to the mainstream economics 
paradigm that arises a great deal of controversy nowadays.  
 
It would seem that the way the terms are defined and their relationship 
with the accepted mainstream paradigm are not so relevant to the 
actual analysis of the institutional and regulatory changes in the 
financial markets after the financial crisis. Notwithstanding, one shall 
remember that the neoclassical belief in the microfoundations but at the 
same time the need for analysis of the economy as a whole (multiple 
markets simultaneously), led not only to a specific canon of describing 
the functioning of the economy, but also to the development of 
computable general equilibrium models that provide forecasts nowadays 
(Santos, 2012). 
 
An interesting fact is the models used by central bankers before the 
financial crisis widely excluded the financial sector from the analysis. It 
seems also inappropriate that such models focus on the steady state 
and the mathematical conditions of its existence, unity and stability, 
(Hoalle, 2011) without modeling the adjustment process that is only 
partially depicted in the saddle-path stability diagram and the impulse-
response analysis. 
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Due to the strong relationship between politics and economics, both the 
way the economy is analyzed by the policy-makers and forecasts made 
by central bankers have their direct impact on regulatory mechanisms 
and institutional changes.  
 
So far two theories were presented: the theory of market failure and 
the theory of general equilibrium that both largely determined the study 
of financial regulation. The last normative question of this part of the 
study is related to the potential paradigm shift in macroeconomics and 
the appropriateness of the current perception of the essence, the role 
and purpose of financial regulation. These issues were taken under 
study during the series of conferences in the Bank of England and the 
European Central Bank in the period between 2010 and 2012. In the 
consequence of the discussions about the challenges in systemic risk 
measurement and modeling, P. Hartman (2011) expressed his point of 
view on the need of monitoring the so called amplifications and 
feedback effects as well as changing in the econometric modeling: 
inclusion of non-linearities and regime changes. 
 
In fact, the feedback and amplification effects are not new concepts. 
One of the most important publications is Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) 
paper on the dynamic multiplier effect. After the crisis emergence, the 
importance of this topic has grown considerably. Notwithstanding, one 
shall remember that the amplification mechanism is in fact a 
multidimensional concept and it is used in many ways. A. Korinek 
(2011) indicated the close relation between the amplification effects 
and negative externalities. In the last section of the paper the issue of 
amplification and feedback effects will be analyzed with more details for 
the U.S. and Euro Area countries. 
3. INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY CHANGES IN THE FINANCIAL 
MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES 
here are many publications on the causes, course and 
consequences of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, as well as the 
sovereign debt and banking crises (Nawrot, 2009). In this section, 
however, we will focus primarily on the analysis of the obstacles and 
challenges faced by the financial regulation and the presentation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the reform of the financial system in the 
United States after the crisis. It is necessary to analyze all those 
challenges to point out the difficulties that regulatory institutions can 
face. 
 
Initially, different interpretations of the role of securitization in the 
financial crisis will be presented. Secondly, the liquidity problems in the 
federal funds market will be analyzed in order to verify two hypotheses 
T 
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(Alfonso, Kovner and Schoar, 2010): the moral hazard hypothesis and 
the liquidity hoarding one. They are decisive for the analysis of the loss 
of confidence on the interbank market (Brunnermeier and Gordon, 
2012). In the third subsection, the main elements of the Dodd Frank 
reform will be analyzed and we present several conclusions from the 
discretionary policies and reforms undertaken in the United States. 
 
The outbreak of the global financial crisis in the first place, before its 
effects on the real sector, had impacts on the financial markets, the 
banking and insurance sectors as well as the equity markets (Nawrot, 
2009). In most of the analyses, the role of the CDS and MBA securities 
is emphasized. For that reason, in the analysis begins with the 
explanation of securitization. 
 
Securitization is the “process through which loans are removed from the 
balance sheet of lenders and transformed into debt securities by 
investors” (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008). 
One widely shared opinion is the key role of mortgages securitization in 
the financial crisis. This opinion had impact on the shape of the Dodd-
Frank reform in the United States. 
 
However, as R. Bubb from the New York School of Law and A. Kaufman 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston note the role of the 
securitization as an generator of the mortgage crisis is not so clear 
(Bubb and Kaufman, 2011). The authors worked with a method of 
evaluating the role of securitization in the financial crisis presented by 
B. Keys, T.Mukherjee, A. Seru and V. Vig in 2008. According to the 
methodology under study, banks lend money to borrowers only above a 
certain score (above the score 620). 
 
Figure 1 
Number of loans and annual delinquencies for low documentation loans 
 
 
Source: B. Keys, T.Mukherjee, A. Seru , V. Vig (2008) 
 
Institutional and regulatory changes in the financial markets 
after the crisis emergence (2007-09) 
10 
 
Instituto Universitario de Análisis Económico y Social 
Documento de Trabajo 02/2014, 27 páginas, ISSN: 2172-7856 
It turns out that the same result is used in the process of making 
decision to purchase a loan in the securitization process. As a result 
borrowers with FICO scores 619 have similar solvency characteristics to 
those that have the result of 621. However, for the borrowers in the 
first group the securitization opportunities are limited. The question that 
arises is to what extent these borrowers are treated differently by the 
banks than those achieving the score 621. 
 
The figures presented above depict total loans depending on the score 
and default depending on the result of the scoring. On the first one, one 
can see a huge jump at the level 620. In the second case, one can 
observe that the level of non-performing loans is maintained at the 
same level on both sides of the score 620. The conclusion extracted by 
the authors was straightforward. Because securitization is easier on the 
right side of the chart, in principle, banks lend to borrowers with higher 
levels of non-payment. Securitisation is closely related to moral hazard 
and it leads to a higher level of non-performing loans. The 
interpretation seems to be reasonable. Meanwhile, in 2010, R. Bubb 
and A. Kaufman presented a completely different interpretation of the 
same fact. After further analysis of the data, one can notice that while 
the probability of default increases at 620, the level of securitization at 
this level drops slightly. 
 
Figure 2 
Default rate of Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) 
 
Source: R. Bubb, A.Kaufman (2010) 
The authors pointed out that at this level increase both the total 
number of loans securitized and non-securitized. According to Bubb and 
Kaufman, the overall increase in loans carries a greater amount of 
securitized loans, even if the rate of securitization does not change. 
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Without increasing the likelihood of securitization, we cannot 
unequivocally state the higher level of default occurs because easier 
access to securitization encourages a greater borrowing. It is worth 
noting that the explanation by Bubba and Kaufman calls into question 
some of the elements of the Dodd-Frank reform in the United States, 
which we will analyze in the next part of the work. We turn now to the 
second example of the challenges for regulation become known after 
the financial crisis: the problems of liquidity in the financial markets. 
 
G. Alfonso, A. Kovner and A. Schoar ( published in 2010 an article 
entitled Stressed not Frozen: Interbank market and bank liquidity, 
which analyze the causes of the inhibition of federal funds market 
liquidity. There are two hypotheses for this behavior. The first oneof 
them refers to the problem of moral hazard. The second one is related 
to the lack of trust in financial markets and the so-called liquidity 
hoarding. Once again, it must be stressed that the answer to the 
question about what was the reason to stop federal funds market 
liquidity (and their equivalents in other monetary areas) is crucial for 
finding the most proficient regulation. 
 
The immediate response of central banks to the crisis of confidence in 
banks and other institutions was to inject liquidity. It was coordinated 
with a series of non-conventional discretionary measures by central 
banks on such a large scale and unprecedented in its nature. Without a 
doubt, desirable regulation should refer to the liquidity problems that 
may arise in the future, both banks and other financial institutions. 
Once again, however, it is difficult to accept the thesis of the 
unequivocal rejection of the hypothesis of liquidity hoarding presented 
in the article Stressed not frozen. To a large extent the result obtained 
by the authors are dependent of the Furfine’s algorithm, recently 
critiqued (Armantier and Copeland, 2012). The application of this 
methodology for the interbank market in Europe leads to a series of 
problems such as errors of type 1 and 2 or systematic errors. The 
proposed correction method still presents a number of open questions 
(Brunetti, Di Filippo and Harris, 2011). 
 
The two presented examples of problems and challenges are of course 
only a drop in the sea of the multiple complexities of logical and 
econometric analysis of such a complex subject that is the financial 
crisis and the prepared regulatory solutions. Nevertheless they allow 
assessing the difficulties on this topic. The next section will present both 
solutions developed by experts in the years 2009-2010 in the United 
States, as well as the criticism to these solutions. 
 
In 2009, in response to the financial crisis, U.S. President Barack 
Obama and his advisers presented a series of proposals for regulatory 
and institutional policies. The proposals focused primarily on: consumer 
protection, creating buffers and establishment of capital requirements. 
It also tried to regulate the shadow banking system, the derivatives 
markests as well as it targeted the systemic risk problem. The 
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proposals set out in this period, all together with the amendments 
proposed in Congress and the Senate, in particular the so-called Volcker 
Rule (Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act) and The Durbin Amendment 
constituted the foundation of the Dodd- Frank Act (The Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) adopted in the United 
States in 2010. 
 
Referring to the considerations of the first part of the work , it is worth 
noting that the Dodd- Frank Act is perceived by public opinion not only 
as the only possible consensus that can be achieved at that moment, 
but also the only existing complication of resonable regulatory 
mechanisms. Meanwhile, at least to some extent, substantive 
discussion of regulatory changes and institutional proposals contained in 
the Dodd- Frank Act and in the alternatives proposal - The Paulson plan 
(US Department of Treasury, 2008), is driven by the need of political 
success. The object of this section is to evaluate regulatory mechanisms 
and supervision proposals presented in the 16 chapters of the Dodd-
Frank Act as well as their posterior comparison with the proposals 
included in the so-called Paulson Plan.  
 
In the first chapter the financial stability issues are concerned as well as 
the issue of systemic risk. In this part of the legislative act two 
institutions are set up: the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) 
and the Office of the Financial Regulator (OFR).  The first one is 
responsible for regulations related to issues of systemic risk. The 
second one’s aim is to prepare the analyses of financial data . According 
to the Act, the authority that has power of indicating systemically 
important financial institutions is FED. It is also in charge of 
determining the capital requirements and the permitted limits of 
leverage. The main weak point of the institutional framework 
established in the Act is the limited role of FSOC since 2010.  
 
Identification of the systematically important institutions threatens the 
stability of the financial system as it is shaping the erroneous 
expectation that these institutions are too -big- to- fail. Thus it 
enhances the problem of moral hazard. Consequently, the discipline is 
being challenged in the market. Another issue is also the application by 
the Fed of the same regulatory model to both banks and other financial 
institutions.  
 
The second chapter introduces the financial institutions resolution 
mechanisms by the government agencies. Two alternative methods 
used to be compared in such context: the old way of declaring 
bankruptcy, the so-called Orderly Liquidation Authority mechanism, and 
the second one: the so-called FDIC – run resolution mechanism. The 
positive thing is the inclusion of the resolution mechanisms to the 
solutions introduced in the U.S., contrary to the ones established in the 
Europe. Opponents, however, claim that the Dodd-Frank Act creates 
additional institutions instead of reforming the old one, so that the final 
institutional framework is rather blurred. The other weak point is the 
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procedure of evaluating the institutions that are indicated as the ones 
threatening the stability of the financial system. The resolution 
mechanisms is not supervised by the court, therefore, it is quite difficult 
to control the mechanism. In fact, the FDIC joins political and economic 
power.  
 
The third chapter eliminates the Office of Thrift Supervision, one of the 
supervisory agencies that has committed a great number of errors in 
the initial phase of the financial crisis (e.g. Case AIG , Washington 
Mutual and IndyMac scandal) . It transmits its competence, also in 
accordance to the Paulson plan, to the Office of the Controller of the 
Currency. The regulations contained in the third chapter also raise the 
deposit insurance now up to $ 250,000. The legitimacy of such a 
solution is not subject to discussion. Notwithstanding, the amount of 
the deposit insurance generates controversies. Too high level of the 
deposit insurance restrict the number of risky transactions that 
institutions are undertaking, leading to the instability of the whole 
financial system. In addition, in this chapter the creation of the new 
additional institutions was taken into account, such as the Office of 
Minority and Women Inclusion at financial regulatory agencies. In the 
fourth chapter, the risky institutions were regulated such as: hedge 
funds and private investment funds, and they are now subjected to the 
previous registration in the SEC (Security and Exchange Commission). 
In the fifth chapter, the insurance sector will be concerned. In this part, 
the FIO, the Federal Insurance Office, was established as the office 
associated with the Ministry of the Treasury.  
 
The aim of this institution is to monitor the sector and to conduct 
research on the conditions of the institutions. It supports the FSOC in 
determining the systematically important institutions to the entire 
system. The problem of this institutional change is the one related to 
the unrestricted access to confidential information of the agency, which 
in opinion of some experts, has no substantial preparation for carrying 
out its activities. Therefore, instead of solving old problems, the new 
ones are created. The next chapter expands the Fed's regulatory 
powers and implements the so-called Volcker Rule, which prohibits 
banks to engage in real estate trading, hedge funds and private equity 
funds. Opinions about the acquisition of the majority of the regulatory 
and supervisory competence have both its supporters and opponents. 
 
We will return to this issue at the last part of the work on the role of the 
central bank in maintaining the stability of the financial system. In the 
context of the Volcker Rule, paying further attention to the details is 
needed because it is insufficient to determine which activities are 
acceptable and which are not. As a result the liquidity of the financial 
system can be compromised. In the chapter six, the regulator of the 
OTC markets was changed and in the charge of them are: CTFC and 
SEC. The experts draw attention to the possibility of conflicts of 
jurisdiction between the two institutions.  
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The rules require the submission of transaction reports or the use of 
controller to the central clearinghouses. Financiers emphasize, however, 
that established a regulatory regime corresponds to markets more 
liquid than OTC and central chambers of accounts poses greater 
systemic risks than to made transactions on OTC markets. In the 
seventh chapter were recognized the competence in the field of FSOC to 
indicate activities and institutions potentially threatening the stability of 
the financial system or the validity of the system. 
 
Fed and the CFTC are in charge of determining risk management 
standards that are then set by the FSOC to the institutions. It also 
allows the Fed to lend funds on preferential terms to the threatened 
institutions. Once again, this element tends to abusive (moral hazard 
problem). Financial institutions are willing to diversify its operations 
over to the hazardous conditions to ensure a back-up in the form of 
public funds.  
 
The ninth element of the reform is the creation of a number of agencies 
within the SEC (the Office of Whistleblower, the Office of the Investor 
Advocate, the Office of Credit Ratings, and the Office of Municipal 
Securities) and ensuring transfer of additional powers to SEC. One of 
the major misconceptions of the reform is only partial reform of credit 
rating agencies. Transfer of sovereignty over them, the SEC does not in 
itself solve the problems that create an incorrect classification of risk. A 
very superficial treatment of the problem complicates situation in the 
derivatives market and the process of securitization. During the 
discussion on the causes, course and consequences of the financial 
crisis, securitization was presented as the main “culprit “of the 
underestimation of risk, and thus the crisis. In fact, the populist polemic 
was confined only to the issue of systemic risk.  
 
The remaining chapters implement the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) and introduce the Durbin that controls the charge for the 
use of debit cards. Also describe the conditions for the transfer of aid to 
financial institutions in difficulties.  
 
The aim of the CFPB is to protect the consumer. Its activity is not, 
however, to be periodically assessed by the Congress or the Fed. Its 
tasks have been specified in the document too broad to allow this 
institution for effective fulfillment of its tasks. The Durbin Amendment 
distorts the market through introduction of the mechanism of self-
determination and adjustment of prices. The establishment of support 
mechanisms creates certain expectations in the market that could lead 
once again to taking excessive risks in their business.  
 
Even greater controversy arouses the discretional way of Treasury to 
indicate and eventually provide founds to some systemically important 
institutions. However, such aid is inefficient and distorts the price 
mechanism.  
Institutional and regulatory changes in the financial markets 
after the crisis emergence (2007-09) 
15 
 
Instituto Universitario de Análisis Económico y Social 
Documento de Trabajo 02/2014, 27 páginas, ISSN: 2172-7856 
The last important element is the order of selling shares and bonds. In 
this context, the role of Troubled Asset Relief Program was reduced and 
there was introdueced the requirement of the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency to submit to Congress a report on its plans for financing 
investments related to the real estate market. In fact, the reduction of 
the role of TARF has enormous costs.  
 
Without any doubt, the Dodd- Frank Act represents an ambitious 
legislative solution. The key question, however, is to what extent the 
institutional and regulatory changes that postulates the Dodd-Frank Act 
really solve problems after the financial crisis emergence. The answer 
to this question depends not only on our understanding of the nature 
and consequences of the regulation as such, but also on the  existing 
consensus on the causes, course and consequences of the financial 
crisis. Some experts believe that the Dodd - Frank reform does not 
solve the problem of funding mortgages and other investments related 
to real estate market. In addition, attention is drawn to emphasize the 
role of insufficient capital buffers and a misunderstanding of the nature 
of the problem of systemic risk. We will go back to these issues after 
analyzing the solutions currently implemented in Europe, but it is worth 
stressing the importance of the rules of governing the institutions for 
the stability of the financial system and that the provisions for providing 
public back up as well as resolution mechanisms can in fact amplify the 
problems related to market failures (moral hazard and negative 
externalities), instead of solving them. It can be seen in the case of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Both institutions were funtioning in a 
similar way before the crisis and were backed up during the crisis. 
Another problem of the Dodd-Frank Act is related to the implementation 
of the Volcker Rule.  The bank activiities related to the real estate 
market do not cause itself financial crisis. Even after implmenting the 
Dodd-Frank solutions, financial institutions will carry out such type of 
transactions even after the introduction of new regulations. 
 
The last weak point is the one indicated by L. White (1997)in the book  
Absence of a Tax on Size. What does he means by that? If the size of 
the financial institution (as measured by the amount of assets held) is 
understood as a social problem (because the size of these assets 
generates systemic effects). Then it should be analyzed in terms of the 
so-called paradigm of negative external effect. In microeconomic 
theory, we know that the best solution that can be implemented by the  
regulators in the case of a negative external effect is imposition of a tax 
on size. Of course, in this way, White wanted to draw our attention not 
only to rejected proposal of tax proportional to the size of the 
institution, but primarily, to a partial recognition of regulatory 
arrangements of the Dodd - Frank Act .It is impossible to fully present 
here a discussion on the merits of solutions introduced by the latest 
reform of the financial markets in the United States. In conclusion, it is 
worth mentioning that alternative proposals for reforming financial 
markets' structure  was presented by Paulson half a year before the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
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In contrast to the Dodd- Frank Act , the Paulson proposal does not put 
emphasize on the government agencies as a regulatory institutions. The 
Paulson was closer to the Hayek's idea that we should recognize some 
advantages of letting the market to order spontaneously. According to 
the Paulson proposal, the President Working Group  (the  PWGT) would 
be reformed and expanded, and it would consists of representatives of 
the Ministry of the Treasury , the Fed , the SEC and the CFTC. This 
agency should focus on the stability of the entire financial system , not 
only on the individual financial markets. The plan also payed more 
attention to the mortgage market . The author also advocated proposals 
for consolidation of the SEC and CFTC activities . Indeed, this is the 
item for which openly advocated Frank in 2011, and thus after the 
adoption of the reform in Congress. In this part of the work were 
presented challenges of both regulation of financial markets and the 
financial sector , as well as the most important aspects of the adopted 
reform in the United States . The next section will examine the financial 
regulation on the example of the Euro Zone. 
4. CHANGES IN THE INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
IN THE EURO ZONE 
o be able to analyze the causes of the financial crisis, firstly we 
should look at the subprime market in the United States. The 
effects of the subprime crisis were severe in the U.S. but also in 
the other parts of the world, including the Euro Area. In this section we 
present the institutional and regulatory mechanisms introduced in the 
Euro Area and other measures that could be potentially undertaken. As 
it will be presented in the following part, the European institutional and 
regulatory changes have been affected by the solutions implemented in 
the United States but they were also adjusted taking into account 
different characteristics of the continent. 
 
To analyze those institutional and regulatory changes in the Euro Area, 
firstly the most import points of the Larosière Group report will be 
presented as well as its relations with the Basel II and Basel III 
solutions and G20 recommendations. 
 
In 2009, in the United States the details presented in the legislative act 
called the Dodd- Frank Reform were discussed. At the same time in 
Europe the need for comprehensive reform of the financial markets and 
the whole financial system was also discussed. One of the proposals 
was the so-called the de Larosière Rreport (2009). In the first part of 
the report the shortcomings of regulation during the crisis were 
examined. Among the most important ones, the de Larosière Group 
indicated: the capital requirements that put too much confidence on the 
ability of the banks to manage their risks and on the evolutions made 
T 
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by the credit ratings, the problem of paying too little attention to 
liquidity problems, problems with estimating the exposure of financial 
institutions to risks related to the subprime market by the regulator, the 
lack of information on the leverage, relying on the microprudential 
supervision and understimating the systemic risk. 
 
In the paper, there is a clear distinction between financial markests 
regulation and financial supervision. The goal of regulation is to 
maintain the stability of the financial system and to protect customers 
of financial services. Supervision means to adjust the financial 
institution behavior to ensure their proper application of rules and 
standards. In practice, financial regulation and supervision are closely 
related to each other. In the de Larosière Report the basic proposals to 
change supervision and regulation in Europe were made. All proposals 
were collected into 3 groups: 
 
 Proposals for reforming some of the important aspects of the 
current regulatory framework 
 Proposals for removing regulatory gaps 
 Micro and macro-prudential supervision 
 
With regard to the first group, we should analyze primarily Basel II 
regulations, e.g. too low capital requirements; the problems of ratings 
agencies as well as internal risk assessment models. In the context of 
the existing regulation, the problem of procyclicality also appears. To 
reduce the procyclicality of regulation, inter alia banks should assess 
the risk using an approach based on the cycle. In practice, it means 
that they should create buffers dynamically, larger during the boom, so 
they can be used during the recessions. Such procedure is justified by 
the micro-prudential regulation. It would reduce the probability of 
getting bankrupt by the particular bank. 
 
According to the recommendations included in the de Larosière Report, 
statistical and econometric models used in the risk assessment as well 
as accounting rules should be changed. Another difficulty that was 
emphasized in the de Larosière Report is the way liquidity is measured 
and in this context the Basel Committee recommendations shall be 
followed. Another extremely important thing is the introduction of a 
new strict rule regarding off-balance sheet structures as well as internal 
auditing and risk management. The de Larosière Group recommends 
also the revision of the way rating agencies are functioning. First of all, 
their activities shall be reviewed and even some of their activities shall 
be limited. According to the members of the Group, it is necessary to 
adopt the II Solvency Directive, related to insurances. 
 
With regard to the second one, the regulatory gaps, the emphasis 
should be put on regulating the shadow banking system. In this 
context, the existing regulation shall be expanded to cover at least the 
systematically important institutions conducting financial activities. The 
transparency on the financial markets shall be also improved and 
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capital requirements shall be adjusted especially in the case of banks 
owning hedge funds. The greater transparency is also needed in the 
functioning of derivatives markets. In this context, it is crucial to 
simplify and standardize derivatives, to create a central chamber of 
auditors and to improve the governance of financial institutions. 
 
The third issue that was covered in the de Larosière Report was related 
to the distinction between the microprudential and macroprudential 
policies and regulation. As it was previously emphasized regulation and 
supervision are mutually interdependent and reinforcing. The objective 
of macroprudential supervision is to reduce imbalances in the financial 
system as a whole. This issue will be analyzed in the next section with 
more details. At the end, it is worth mentioning that recommendations 
of the de Larosière Report supposed a basis for the rearrangement of 
institutional framework in the Euro Area, especially we can notice it in 
the creation of European Systemic Risk Board, the European Banking 
Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
as well as the European Securities and Market Authority. 
 
The European institutional framework was influenced by the U.S. one, 
for that reasons, all arguments presented in the third part of the article 
can also be applied tothe Euro Area.  Notwithstanding, one of the main 
elements that distinguishes the new U.S. institutional framework from 
the European one is the lack of financial institutions resolution 
mechanism in the case of Europe.  This element was widely criticized by 
many international experts in the financial regulation and prudential 
policies, especially in the context of the recent proposals of the Banking 
Union creation. However, the ideas of Banking Union or even the Vienna 
Initiative, though important and very interesting, are out of the scope 
of this article. 
 
Finally, as two economists Ch. Goodhart and T. Back emphasized, there 
is a need to establish a mechanism that would allow for resolution of 
financial institutions that threaten the stability of financial system, but 
the situation is getting even more complicated as the Euro Area is not 
homogeneous and all decisions that should be made by the members 
would necessarily transfer some political competences to the 
supranational institution. In fact, it is that element that arouses a great 
deal of controversy between the members. Notwithstanding, this is also 
out of the scope of this article as it all should be subjected to the 
further analysis of interdependencies that exist between politics and 
economics. 
 
The last issue we would like to mention is the problem of systemic risk. 
Both the Dodd-Frank Act as well as the institutional framework 
introduced in the Euro Area based on the recommendations of the de 
Larosière Group is aimed to reduce also the systemic risk in the 
financial sector and real economy. The Dodd-Frank establishes the 
FSOC institution that has a power to indicate institutions that are 
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important from the point of view of the stability of the financial system 
as well as the ones that could be a potential threat to its stability. 
 
Notwithstanding, the institutional changes introduced in the Dodd-Frank 
Act can create inappropriate expectation that the institutions indicated 
by the FSOC and FED are in fact too-big-too-fail. In the case of liquidity 
problems or even insolvency, there is a high probability that those 
institutions would be backed up by receiving public funds. In fact, it 
could exacerbate the problem of asymmetric information in the financial 
markets. This institutional and regulatory changes are not justified 
neither by the theory of market failure nor by the proposals presented 
by Hartman. Perhaps, however, it could be interpreted as a response to 
the certain temporal need justified rather by the political theory than 
the economic theory. And how the problem of systemic risk has been 
solved in the Euro Zone? Is the European systemic risk really similar to 
the U.S. systemic risk? The answer is negative. For that reason, all 
regulatory and institutional changes shall also be adjusted to the 
characteristics of the European financial system. 
 
To depict this problem, let us consider the problem of banking sector in 
Spain. In the centre of the problem nobody would find too-big-to-fall 
interconnectividness (too interconnected to fail). In the case of Spain, 
the problem was the existence of gaps in regulating savings institutions 
(esp. Cajas de Ahorros) and their relations with public sector. The 
problem is getting even more complicated if one notices that banks 
passed stress tests in 2008 and 2009. Taking into account not only 
those problems, but also a great deal of other questions and the 
multidimensionality of the concept of risk, there is a need to move to 
the macro-prudential policies and the idiosyncratic risk shall be treated 
only as a element of the wider systemic risk cube. Furthermore, we 
should also be aware of the margin of statistic errors that certain 
institutions provide to the regulator. 
 
During the crisis, there is a great need to analyze carefully all 
theoretical and empirical aspects of risks, the way it could be measured 
and modeled as well as the potential proposals of policies that could 
mitigate the risk in the financial system. International institutions are 
extremely aware of that need and further indicators were prepared 
recently to evaluate risk, especially systemic risk in the markets. The 
good example is the Co-Var developed by Brunnermeier and Adrian 
from the University of Princeton. Of course it is not possible to analyze 
in depth the issue of systemic risk in the presented work and it was 
included just to emphasize the complexity of financial regulation and 
supervision issues. 
 
In the fourth part, the most important elements of regulatory and 
institutional changes in the Euro Area were presented, including the 
main recommendations of the de Larosière Report, Basel II and Basel 
III as well the idea of Banking Union.  There were also been indicated 
the institutions created to target main challenges of financial regulation 
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and policies, including the problem of systemic risk. The main 
conclusion of this part is a need for extending the analysis of risk in the 
Euro Area to include not only idiosyncratic risk but also the systematic 
component. In the broader sense, all risks shall be seen as a 
component of the systemic risk cube presented by Hartman. 
5. THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK IN MAINTAINING THE STABILITY 
OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
he concept of stability of the financial system repeatedly appeared 
in this paper, both in the context of the theory of market failure 
(such as the stability of the financial system as an example of a 
public good) as well as in the proposals for reform of the financial 
markets and supervision (Dodd-Frank Act, analysis of de Larosière 
Report and the institutional model later adopted in Europe inspired by 
this report). 
The key questions asked by both theorists and practitioners (policy 
makers) are those related to the central bank's role in ensuring and 
maintaining the stability of the financial system and the relations 
between regulation and monetary policy. In a broader sense one should 
ask the question whether the central bank should monitor the prices of 
financial assets and treat appropriate indicators only as a source of 
additional information on the economy to maintain price and currency 
stability. On the contrary, it should actively work to counteract the 
formation of bubbles in asset markets (real estate market). The 
question boils down to the question raised in 2009 by W. White: Should 
monetary policy ‘lean or clear’? The answer to the last of the questions 
is beyond the scope of this work. We focus instead on the analysis of the 
interactions between control (supervision of the financial and banking 
system) and the monetary policy. 
The literature does not provide a clear answer to the question whether 
the central bank should take over the powers of supervision. On the one 
hand it points to increase the efficiency of decision-making, on the other 
hand, it draws attention to the problems of legitimacy (from the point of 
view of the theory of democracy). Likewise, in practice, combining both 
functions could bring both benefits and some losses. Because of a 
number of political issues, in that context many substantive arguments 
have been rejected. In the case of the US and Europe, the powers of the 
central banks were expanded, but the comptences of supervision and 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have analyzed the most likely and the most desirable 
developments in financial markets (and in a broader sense, the most 
desirable regulation of the financial sector). Many of the issues we have 
been treated in a brief. The purpose of the essay was in fact signaling 
the most important issues of financial regulation and to highlight that 
finding the most desirable solutions are particularly difficult. These 
difficulties result from purely technical reasons (econometrics, 
statistics), the multi-dimensionality of the analyzed problems, but also 
some aspects of the methodology and philosophy under the current 
methodological approach for financial regulation. 
It remains to express the hope that this essay will provide some kind of 
contribution to the further discussion of the nature, objectives and 
regulatory practices, as well as a thorough analysis of issues such as 
systemic risk if the relations that exist between economic and regulatory 
solutions. 
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